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We analyze funeral arrangements following the deaths of 3,751 people who died between January
2003 and December 2005 in the Africa Centre Demographic Surveillance Area. We find that, on average,
households spend the equivalent of a year’s income for an adult's funeral, measured at median per
capita African (Black) income. Approximately one-quarter of all individuals had some form of insurance,
which helped surviving household members defray some fraction of funeral expenses. However, an
equal fraction of households borrowed money to pay for the funeral. We develop a model, consistent
with ethnographic work in this area, in which households respond to social pressure to bury their dead
in a style consistent with the observed social status of the household and that of the deceased. Households
that cannot afford a funeral commensurate with social expectations must borrow money to pay for
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Since 1990, many countries in East and southern Africa have seen a reversal in the trend toward 
greater life expectancy, largely as a result of the AIDS crisis. In South Africa, 1.8 million lives 
have been lost to AIDS since the pandemic took hold (UNAIDS 2008). In one site in South 
Africa that has been under demographic surveillance since the early 1990s, life expectancy 
among females has fallen by 12 years, and among males by 14 years (Kahn et al. 2007).  
Economic research focusing on the long-run effect of AIDS finds, if the crisis results in 
lower population growth, that AIDS could “endow the economy with extra resources which … 
[will] raise the per capita welfare of future generations.” (Young, 2005). This earlier research, 
however, assumes a constant savings rate over the life of the crisis, in order to focus on the effect 
of a potential fertility decline. To the extent that productive resources are diverted into expensive 
funeral celebrations, earlier predictions that the pandemic will benefit future generations 
economically are less likely to come to pass. The financing of burials has implications for a 
household’s ability to maintain a stock of productive assets, to stake migrants in urban areas until 
they find work, to finance schooling, and more broadly to provide adequate nutrition and a 
healthy environment within which to raise children.      
  This paper documents funeral costs and financing for deaths that occurred between 2003 
and 2005 in a demographic surveillance site in northern KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. 
Specifically, we analyze funeral arrangements following the deaths of 3,751 people who died 
between January 2003 and December 2005 in the Africa Centre Demographic Surveillance Area. 
We find that, on average, households spend the equivalent of a year’s income for an adult’s 
funeral, measured at median per capita African (Black) income. Approximately one-quarter of all    2 
 
individuals had some form of insurance, which helped surviving household members defray 
some fraction of funeral expenses. However, an equal fraction of households borrowed money to 
pay for the funeral.  
We also examine how households determine appropriate spending for funerals. To do so, 
we set out a model, consistent with ethnographic work in this area, in which households respond 
to social pressure to bury their dead in a style consistent with the observed social status of the 
household and that of the deceased. Households that cannot afford a funeral commensurate with 
social expectations must borrow money to pay for the funeral. The model leads to empirical 
tests, and we find results consistent with our model of household decision-making.    
  The next section introduces the data we use to quantify funeral behavior. Section 3 
discusses funeral costs in more detail. Section 4 presents a model of household decision-making, 
and tests the model using our data. Section 5 offers some thoughts on the sustainability of the 
current burial practices, and the implications of current practices for the future wellbeing of 
household members.       
 
2. Data 
In 2000, the Africa Centre for Health and Population Studies began demographic surveillance of 
approximately 11,000 households in the Umkhanyakude District in northern KwaZulu-Natal. 
The surveillance site includes both a township and a rural area administered by a tribal authority. 
At six month intervals, every household is visited and demographic and health information is 
collected on all household members. Individuals may be resident in the Demographic 
Surveillance Area (DSA), or may be non-resident members of households that claim them as    3 
 
members. Approximately two-thirds of all persons under demographic surveillance are resident 
in the DSA at any one time. (See Tanser et al. 2007 for details on the Africa Centre site and 
surveillance protocols.) 
Upon learning of the death of a household member, a verbal autopsy nurse is sent to 
interview the deceased’s primary caregiver.
1 Symptoms and health seeking behavior of the 
deceased are recorded, and sent to two clinicians, who independently assess the information and, 
where possible, assign a cause of death. For deaths between January 2003 and December 2005, 
information was also collected on the costs associated with the illness, and with the funeral. This 
information, from the Illness and Death (IAD) Survey, forms the basis of our analysis. 
We augment these data with information that was collected on household socioeconomic 
status in two rounds of data collection. Household Socio-Economic Survey 1 (HSE1) was 
conducted in 2001, and Household Socio-Economic Survey 2 (HSE2), between January 2003 and 
June 2004. When possible, we assign household SES information from HSE1, in order to 
quantify the economic and demographic characteristics of the household prior to the death.   
  
Characteristics of the Demographic Surveillance Area and of those who died 
Column 1 of Table 1 presents information on individuals followed by the Africa Centre 
Demographic Information System (ACDIS) in 2001, at the time of HSE1. Just over half of all 
individuals followed by ACDIS are female. The population under surveillance is young, with a 
mean age of 23 years. Employment opportunities in the area under surveillance are quite limited, 
and many household members migrate to find work. This is reflected in reports that only 34 
                                                 
1 In order to respect households in mourning, the verbal autopsy visit occurs with a lag of at least 6 months. For 
details on the protocol, visit http://www.africacentre.ac.za.     4 
 
percent of adults resident in the DSA worked for money in 2001, in contrast with 58 percent of 
non-resident adults. Individuals in the DSA live in large households, with an average of 10 
members, 7 of whom are resident in the DSA.
2  
Column 2 presents information on individuals followed by ACDIS who died between 
2003 and 2005. Household characteristics of those who died are similar to those of all persons 
followed by ACDIS. Household sizes (10.08 vs. 10.35 members), number of working adult 
members (1.96), and number of children (4.58 vs. 5.00) are all quite comparable. Employment 
for adults who died between 2003 and 2005 are similar to reports for resident members as a 
whole, with 32 percent of the deceased reported to have been working before they fell ill.  
Age at death over this period was 38 years, on average. This reflects the large AIDS 
burden that this region is shouldering. Verbal autopsies diagnose that 48 percent of all deaths in 
the DSA from 2003 to 2005 were due to AIDS, which is associated both with high infant 
mortality and with death in middle age. 
Individuals old enough to have gone to school at HSE1 (ages 6 and older) who 
subsequently died had a half year less education than other individuals followed in ACDIS, on 
average. However, given changing educational attainment between cohorts and differences in the 
age profile of those who died and others followed in ACDIS, this difference is much reduced 
when one controls for age and age squared at HSE1 (so that those who died, age adjusted, had 
attained 0.18 fewer years of education at HSE1).   
 
 
                                                 
2 These numbers are presented at the level of individuals within the DSA, in order to compare their information with 
that from people who died. At the level of the household, average household size is 7.6, with 5.5 resident members.     5 
 
         
3. Funerals in the DSA  
It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of funerals in South African life. Funerals 
serve to honor the dead, who are entering a new life as ‘ancestors.’ In addition, funerals mark the 
deceased’s status (and that of his family) within the community. They also strengthen ties with 
neighbors and extended family, who may travel long distances to attend the funeral. More than 
any other single rite of passage – births, graduations, marriages – funerals provide a focal point 
for family and community life. (See Roth 1999 for discussion.) 
For some or all of these reasons, funerals are elaborate, and expensive. In addition to 
expenses for a coffin, traditional burial blankets, and (often) a tent for the funeral, immediate 
family must pay to entertain mourners. After a death, extended household members may arrive 
for a lengthy visit. It is expected that the immediate family of the deceased will feed mourners 
who have come for the funeral, for as long as they choose to stay. In addition, animals are 
slaughtered to honor the dead. Precise customs vary from place to place, but in KwaZulu-Natal, 
when an adult male dies, general custom is to kill a cow, and to use its meat to feed all present. 
This is an expensive proposition: cattle during this period sold for approximately 2000 Rand a 
head.
3 With median per capita income among Africans (Blacks) approximately 400 Rand a 
month, the cow represents more than a third of a year’s income for half the African population. 
When an adult female dies, a goat is slaughtered. While less expensive than a cow, this is still a 
considerable expense for the household.  
                                                 
3 Prices are those reported by survey respondents during the 2003-2005 period of data collection. These are 
consistent with other reports for this period. King (2004) reports sale prices for a cow fluctuated between R1500 and 
R2000 in the former bantustan of KaNgwane, between 2000 and 2002. McCord (2004) reports that sale prices for 
cows varied from R700 to R3000 in Limpopo in mid-2003. Since that time, prices for cattle have increased. The 
Weekend Argus (2006) reports the market price for a cow in December 2006 as R3000.     6 
 
  
Burial societies and funeral policies     
One mechanism that has evolved in South Africa to help individuals save for funerals are savings 
clubs or accounts that pay out only upon death. These include membership in a burial society, or 
the purchase of a funeral policy with a funeral parlor or an insurance company. Money paid into 
a funeral policy can only be drawn upon at death. For approximately 20 to 30 Rand per month 
(more, if one is insuring additional household members), individuals are guaranteed that some 
expenses incurred for their funerals will be paid for by the insurer.  
Information on who participated in these policies, and what the policies paid at the time 
of the death, is presented in Table 2. Twenty-eight percent of the deceased had a policy of some 
variety, almost all of which paid something. Participation in burial societies and funeral policies 
is closely related to individuals’ receipt of the South African state old-age pension. A generous 
pension is provided monthly in cash to women over age 60 and men over age 65. (See Case and 
Deaton 1998 for details.) Each month, after receiving their pension, pensioners can pay into their 
burial account at the pension pay point. (Funeral parlors and insurance companies are the only 
private firms allowed to conduct business inside pension pay points, which are generally 
surrounded by a fence or barrier of some sort.) In the IAD data, 79 percent of pensioners 
participated in a burial fund, true of only 18 percent of individuals who were not pension-
eligible.
4    
Over half of these policies were held with funeral parlors; and 40 percent with other 
private insurers. Nearly all of the policies (91 percent) paid money to the household at the time 
                                                 
4 The probability of participating in a burial fund jumps by 35 percentage points as men and women move from 
being slightly too young to receive the pension, to being just old enough to be age-eligible for the pension.    7 
 
of the funeral. The cash payments are large, averaging 4500 Rand. This money need not be spent 
by the household on the funeral but, as we shall see below, in general it represents only part of 
funeral spending for individuals who held policies.       
Policies were much less likely to provide goods in kind. Only 23 percent of policies 
provided a coffin; 23 percent provided food; 13 percent, a tent. Even when a policy provides a 
coffin or food, the deceased’s household may incur additional expenses for these items. While it 
is rare in the IAD data to find that additional money was used to ‘upgrade’ the coffin provided by 
the policy, it is not unknown (4 percent of cases). It is quite common for additional money to be 
spent on meat and groceries, if the provision of food was part of the policy. (92 percent of cases 
spent additional money on meat; 75 percent spent additional money on groceries.)   
 
Funeral costs  
Information on purchases for the funeral is presented in Table 3, where means are presented for 
all deaths, and separately for those deaths for which the deceased had a funeral policy. With the 
exception of expenditure on transport, spending on each funeral-related item was significantly 
higher when the deceased had a funeral policy than it was when the deceased did not. Large 
expenditures include a coffin, 858 Rand on average; meat, 1382 Rand on average; and groceries, 
1084 Rand on average. Other expenditures, for example on burial blankets, are close to 
universal, but are much less expensive. Overall, spending on funerals averages 4300 Rand per 
burial. It is significantly higher if the deceased had a funeral policy (5900 Rand), or if we restrict 
our attention to adult deaths (4700 Rand).      8 
 
  Table 4 presents information on who paid for these funeral-related expenses. (Note that 
when a funeral policy paid money, and that money was used to purchase funeral-related items, 
this is included in the household members’ contributions toward funeral expenses.) The vast 
majority of expenses (90 percent) were paid by household members living with the deceased at 
the time of the death. This is true both for funerals where a funeral policy paid, and for funerals 
in which one did not. Other family, not in the household, contributed 6 percent of resources put 
toward the funeral, with community, church, and employers contributing smaller amounts. In the 
IAD questionnaire, expenses for funeral items were asked separately from reports on who 
contributed to the funeral, and at what level. The reports nonetheless balance: the primary 
caregiver on average can recall 4273 Rand worth of funeral expenses, and 4228 Rand of 
contributions made by family and others.   
  The second panel of Table 4 reports on borrowing that the households undertook to 
finance funerals. Nearly a quarter of all deaths resulted in money being borrowed to pay for the 
funeral. Conditional on borrowing, households took loans from money lenders over 50 percent of 
the time; neighbors, 25 percent; and other family, 14 percent of the time. The statistics on money 
lenders are troubling: in South Africa, money lenders charge exorbitant interest rates, 30 percent 
per month or more (Siyongwana 2004). Poor households who borrow 1300 Rand from a money 
lender for a funeral may find themselves paying back many multiples of that over several years.
5  
  In summary, funerals are expensive, and often leave households economically vulnerable. 
In the next section, we examine the determinants of funeral spending and borrowing. We develop 
a model of household decision-making on funeral spending, which provides tests for our data. 
                                                 
5 Consistent with findings of Roth (1999), we rarely observe households selling assets to pay funeral expenses.  Roth 
argues that this is largely because the time between the sale of the asset and the receipt of cash is too long for 
households who need immediate cash to pay for funeral-related items.     9 
 
 
   
4. Household decision-making on funeral spending and borrowing    
The ethnographic literature and our own experience in training field workers to administer 
questionnaires on illness and death modules suggest that social norms are held strongly and play 
an important role in setting funeral spending.
6 Denoting characteristics that mark an individual’s 
status (sex and relationship to the head of household, for example) as  1 X  and community and 
extended family perception of household income at the time of the death as 
^
Y , we hypothesize 
that the community and extended family form an opinion about the appropriate size of the 
funeral 




11 FX Y β γ =+ . 
 
Here γ  is the fraction of current household income that is thought to be appropriate to use for the 
burial (0 1) γ <<, net of the spending determined by the deceased’s characteristics.
7 The funeral 
expenses we observe in our data are the desired spending plus an idiosyncratic error: 
 
                                                 
6 In training teams to capture information on funeral spending, we would play the role of the deceased’s primary 
caregiver, and would be interviewed by field workers as a group, so that we could make sure they understood the 
concepts, and filled in forms correctly. If we gave an answer on spending for particular items that did not match the 
field team’s opinion on an appropriate amount to spend, given the scenario laid out about the deceased’s status and 
that of his family, the field team would insist on explaining to us why our response was inappropriate.  
7 We have no evidence that pressure about the size of funeral comes from the community or extended family, rather 
than from within the household  itself. However, ethnographic work suggests that the community plays an important 




11 1 1 (1) FFu X Y u βγ =+ = ++ . 
 
Community and extended family do not observe household income. Instead, they observe 
a vector of household and individual characteristics that are correlated with income, which they 
use to form an expectation of household income. Denoting these observable characteristics as 
2 X , we can express perceived household income 
^
Y  and true household income Y  as: 
 
^
22 2 2 (2) YY u X u β =+ = + , 
 
so that true household income differs from perceived household income by an unobservable 
idiosyncratic shock,  2 u .  
  Households that experience an unobserved income shortfall will be less able to meet 
social expectations with respect to the size of the funeral, without borrowing money. 
Specifically, the household will have inadequate resources to meet 
* F if  
 
*
11 22 (3) ( ) YF X X βγ β <= + . 
 
The probability that the household will need to borrow (1 ) B =  to finance a funeral of size 
* F can 
be written, substituting (2) into (3): 
 
21 1 2 2 (4) Pr[ 1] Pr[ ( 1) ] B uX X β γβ == < +− .    11 
 
 
This provides us with several checks, and a formal test, of our model. First, characteristics 
associated with lower individual status will have different predictions for spending and 
borrowing than do characteristics associated with lower household income. Characteristics of the 
deceased associated with lower individual status (that is, with lower values of  11 X β ) should 
reduce both the size of the funeral, as in (1), and the probability of borrowing, as in (4). In 
contrast, any information available to the community that causes them to revise downward their 
estimate of household income, 
^
Y , should reduce the size of the funeral, as in (1), but increase 
the probability of borrowing for the funeral. We examine these in turn. 
 
Individual status, funeral spending and borrowing  
We provide estimates of the association between individual status, funeral spending and funeral 
borrowing in Table 5. The first set of columns presents results of OLS regressions for funeral 
spending, with and without controls for household characteristics, and the second set provides 
OLS results, using the same specifications, for borrowing money for the funeral.
8  
Characteristics that enter individual status  1 () X  include sex and relationship to the 
household head, and here we examine whether these characteristics move funeral spending and 
borrowing in the same direction, as predicted by the model. Women have lower status in the 
DSA than do men, so we would expect both that less would be spent on women’s funerals, and 
                                                 
8 In our regression analyses, we control for age using indicators for 10-year age categories. Results are not changed 
if, instead, we include age at death and that age squared in our regressions. In addition, regressions include 
indicators for the year of death and an indicator that age at death is missing (true for 5 cases). All regressions allow 
for robust standard errors, allowing for correlation between unobservables for observations from the same 
homestead.    12 
 
that the probability of borrowing for a woman’s funeral would be lower. We find that this is the 
case: with or without controls for household demographics and SES, approximately 600 Rand 
less is spent on a woman’s funeral, and borrowing for a woman’s funeral is 3 to 4 percentage 
points less likely on average.
9   
We also examine whether household members with a more distant relationship to the 
head are treated differently from other members. Relative to a parent, spouse or child of the 
head, we find all other relationships to be associated with lower funeral spending, and a lower 
probability of borrowing for the funeral.
10 Specifically, the funerals of ‘other’ relatives or non-
relatives of the head are approximately 800 to 1000 Rand less expensive, and the probability of 
borrowing for their funerals is 4 percentage points lower.   
 
Observable household characteristics, funeral spending and borrowing   
We can also examine whether observable characteristics that are associated with household 
income have different effects on spending and borrowing, as is predicted by our model. Table 6 
presents OLS regression results for funeral spending (columns 1 to 6) and borrowing for funerals 
(columns 7 to 12). We find that household assets are associated with significantly higher 
spending on funerals, with an increase in spending of 316 Rand for each asset, and with a 
significantly lower probability of borrowing, with each asset associated with a 1 percentage point 
drop in the probability of borrowing, on average. 
                                                 
9 This largely reflects the difference in cost between slaughtering cows and goats. With the exception of burial 
clothing, for which a small (34 Rand) but statistically significant amount more was spent on men, meat was the only 
funeral-related expense for which we find a significant difference in spending between the sexes.   
10 “Other” relationships are siblings, grandparents, grandchildren, sons- or daughters-in-law, other family and 
individuals not related to the current head of household. 
    13 
 
The maximum education of any household member is associated with significantly 
higher household income in the DSA. Row 2 of Table 6 finds that maximum education in the 
household at HSE1 is positively related to funeral spending, with each year associated with 
additional funeral expenses of 325 Rand. As was true of household assets, education is 
negatively associated with the probability of borrowing for the funeral, with each year of 
schooling associated with a 0.5 percentage point decline in the probability of borrowing.  
Payments of medical expenses for the deceased prior to death also reduce household 
resources. The next set of regressions in Table 6 examine the association between such expenses 
and funeral outcomes, and finds treatments are associated with significantly lower funeral 
expenditures (475 Rand on average), and a significantly higher probability of borrowing for the 
funeral (3 percentage points). Half of all individuals who died in the DSA between 2003 and 
2005 died of AIDS, which is associated with significantly higher medical expenditures prior to 
death in our IAD sample.
11 When an individual dies of AIDS, almost 1000 fewer Rand are spent 
on the funeral, on average, while the probability of borrowing to pay for the funeral is 7 
percentage points higher. 
The deceased’s own education appears to enter as a marker of household SES, rather than 
of the individual’s own status. The coefficients on own education are much like those we 
observed for maximum education in the household. 
Ninety percent of cases in which the deceased held a funeral policy, that policy paid 
money to the household at the time of the death. Consistent with our model, it is the cash 
                                                 
11 Controlling for age at death, we find total treatments for individuals who died of AIDS to be 315 Rand 
more expensive during this period than treatments for people who died of other causes. (See Naidu and Harris 2005 
for a review of the literature on the impact of AIDS on household economic status.) 
    14 
 
transfer, and not the ownership of a policy, that is associated with significantly higher spending 
on the funeral, and a significantly lower probability of borrowing to fund the funeral.  
Column 6 also suggests that borrowing money for the funeral is not a significant 
predictor of funeral spending. This result is robust to specification,
12 and we turn next to examine 
why this might be the case.  
 
Comparing the spending of borrowers and non-borrowers 
Results presented in Table 4 showed that, conditional on borrowing money, 1400 Rand were 
borrowed on average. However, we find no trace of borrowing on funeral spending. If 
households are attempting to maintain a standard that is consistent with what is expected of 
them, then money borrowed would be used to bring funeral spending in line with social norms.  
If family or community expectations are driving the decision to borrow, the coefficients 
on individual and household characteristics in regressions of funeral spending should be the 
same for those who borrowed and those who did not. We examine this in Table 7, where we 
focus on two markers of individual status – sex, and relationship to the household head – and 
three markers of household SES – asset holdings, maximum education of a household member, 
and an indicator that the deceased died of AIDS. We present OLS regression results for total 
funeral spending for non-borrowers (marked as column 1) and  borrowers (column 2), and 
compare these with results for total funeral spending net of what was borrowed among those who 
borrowed (column 3). Bootstrapped standard errors are presented in parentheses for all results in 
Table 7.   
                                                 
12 An indicator that money was borrowed for the funeral is not significant in a regression of funeral expenses in 
which the only other controls are indicators for age at death and for year of death, or in regressions that also include 
other markers for household socioeconomic status. Results are available from the authors.      15 
 
  We find that the association between individual and household status variables and 
funeral spending are not significantly different when we compare regression coefficients 
between non-borrowers and borrowers from columns (1) and (2). Differences in the regression 
coefficients are jointly and individually equal to zero. In contrast, examining funeral spending 
net of what was borrowed, we find significant differences in the responses to household SES 
variables, when comparing regression results for borrowers and non-borrowers. In particular, the 
coefficients on assets held and on the maximum education of a household member are 
significantly lower in our regression of spending net of borrowing. Taken together, household 
and individual coefficients from this regression are jointly significantly different from those 
presented in column 1 for non-borrowers. This is consistent with households using funds 
borrowed to keep funeral spending in line with expectations.  
 
Formal tests of household decision-making      
Our model also yields formal tests of the association between funeral expenditures and 
borrowing decisions, which we analyze here.  Rewriting the equation for funeral spending as 
 
11 22 1 (1') ( ) FX X u β γβ =+ +  
 











== < +−  
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we can test several elements in our model.  
  First, the ratio of each regression coefficient  1 β , from vector  1 X  in (1'), relative to  the 





 from (4'), should be equal for each element of  1 X .  














Such a test is of interest in its own right, in gauging whether the model fits the data. The ratio of 
the coefficients on  1 X  from (1') and (4') also yield an estimate of the scaling parameter  2 σ  
from (4'). This is useful in what follows. 
  In addition, the ratio of each regression coefficient  2 γβ , from vector  2 X  in (1'), relative 
to the corresponding regression coefficient 
2
2
(1 ) γ β
σ
−
 from (4'), should be equal for each element 














The equality of these ratios provides a second test of our model. We can also use them, together 
with our estimate of  2 σ  from equation (5), to estimate the fraction of household income, γ , that 
is expected will be spent on the funeral.      17 
 
    Results of these tests are provided in Table 8. In chi-square tests presented in the last 
column of the table, we fail to reject the equality of ratios for  1 X  variables (equation 5), or for 
2 X  variables (equation 6). Moreover, these equations yield an estimate of γ , the fraction of 
household income expected to be spent on funerals, equal to 0.56. In the next section, we 
compare this estimate of γ , provided by reduced form estimation of (1') and (4'), with that 
yielded by the maximum likelihood estimation.  
 
Maximum likelihood estimates 
To gain more precision in our estimates, we turn to maximum likelihood estimation. We denote 
the latent variable driving the borrowing decision as 
*
22 2 B FX u β = −− , where 
1 B =  if 
* 0 B > , and 0 otherwise. We assume that funeral expenses and the latent need to borrow 
are jointly normally distributed. The relevant joint density when borrowing occurs will be 
 
22
11 22 2 2 (7) ( , 1) ( , )
FX




−∞ == − − ∫ , 
 
and for cases where no borrowing occurs is 
 
22
11 22 2 2 (, 0 ) ( , )
FX gFB fF X X u d u
β βγ β
∞
− == − − ∫ . 
 
We can express the likelihood function to be maximized as 
    18 
 
(1 )
12 ( 8 ) (, ,) [(, 1 ) ] [(, 0 ) ]
BB Lg F B g F B ββγ
− =∏ = = . 
 
To estimate (8), we re-write (7) as 
 
22
12 2 (, 1 ) (, )
FX
gFB fuu d u
β −
−∞ == ∫ . 
 





z = , yields 
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Under the assumption that  1 u  and z  are mean zero, the distribution of  z conditional on  1 u is 
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Substitution of (10) and (11) into (8) provides the expression we use for our likelihood.  
We present maximum likelihood (ML) estimates for the structural parameters from (1')  
and (4') in Table 9. We again use sex and relationship to the household head as our markers for 
the status of the deceased, and household assets, an indicator that the death was from AIDS, and 
an indicator that a funeral policy paid money at the time of the death as our markers for 
household resources available for the funeral. Our ML estimation suggests households are 
expected to spend a third of household income on a funeral ( 0.34 γ = ), net of the spending    20 
 
expected based on the deceased’s status.
13  Estimates for the impact of household socioeconomic 
status variables are very similar to those presented in Table 8, once we multiply our  2 β  
maximum likelihood coefficients by our estimate of γ .  
 
 5. Conclusions  
This paper provides quantitative evidence from KwaZulu-Natal on the extent to which funerals 
place households at risk, taking potentially productive resources and turning them into 
consumption (coffins, meat, groceries).  In addition, in a quarter of all funerals for individuals 
who died between 2003 and 2005 in the DSA, households borrowed money for the funeral, 
which can be anticipated to drain household resources well into the future. Our point estimates 
suggest that households are expected to spend a third of household income on funerals, in 
addition to the spending expected given the status of the deceased.   
These results do not lead us to optimism on the impact of the AIDS crisis on the future 
economic wellbeing of South Africans. Recent evidence from Demographic and Health Surveys 
suggests that fertility rates may not have fallen in response to the AIDS crisis in the manner 
suggested by Young (2005). (See Fortson 2008, and Juhn, Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan 2008.) To 
this, we add evidence that households are taking what, in other circumstances, could be 
productive capital and using it on coffins, meat and groceries to bury their dead.  
Such elaborate funerals are unlikely to be sustainable, if the AIDS pandemic continues to 
take lives at such a rapid rate. New norms may develop. According to the BBC, the king of 
neighboring Swaziland put a ban on lavish funerals 
                                                 
13 This estimate is smaller than that yielded by reduced form (0.56), however the latter is 
imprecisely estimated, and we cannot reject that the estimates are the same.  
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(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2082281.stm). In South Africa, there is qualitative 
evidence that some communities have tried to set new norms, but these norms are often not 
acceptable to extended family who come in from far away to attend the funeral. The South 
African Council of Churches has called repeatedly for “appropriate and affordable” funerals. 
(See, for example,  http://www.sacc.org.za/docs/AnRept05.pdf .) However, movement in this 
direction has been quite slow. Indeed, our findings suggest that households forced to borrow 
money to pay for funerals do not shade their funeral spending significantly: an indicator that 
money was borrowed for the funeral is not a significant predictor of funeral spending. 
Understanding coordination failures between communities, or among members of extended 
households, will be important if there is to be an effective response working toward smaller, less 
expensive funerals.       22 
 
References 
Case, Anne, and Angus Deaton. 1998. “Large cash transfers to the elderly in South Africa,” 
Economic Journal, 108: 1330-61.  
 
Fortson, Jane G. 2008. “HIV/AIDS and fertility,” mimeo, University of Chicago, September. 
 
Juhn, Chinhui, Sebnam Kalemli-Ozcan and Belgi Turan. 2008. “HIV and fertility in Africa: First 
evidence from population based surveys.” NBER Working Paper 14248. 
 
Kahn, Kathleen, Michel L. Garenne, Mark A. Collinson, and Stephen M. Tollman. 2007. 
“Mortality trends in a new South Africa: Hard to make a fresh start 1.” Scandinavian Journal of 
Public Health 35 (S69): 26-34. 
 
King, Brian H. 2004. “Spaces of change: Tribal authorities in the former KaNgwane homeland, 
South Africa.” (March 5, 2004). Center for African Studies. Breslauer Symposium on Natural 
Resource Issues in Africa. Paper King2004a. Available on line at 
http://repositiories.edlib.org/case/breslauer/king2004a.  
 
McCord, Anna. 2004. “Policy expectations and programme reality: The poverty reduction and 
labour market impact of two public works programmes in South Africa.” Economics and 
Statistics Analysis Unit (ESAU) Working Paper 8. Available on line at 
http://www.odi.org.uk/spiru/publications/working_papers/Esau_8_South_Africa.pdf.  
 
Roth, Jimmy. 1999. “Informal micro-finance schemes: The case of funeral insurance in South 
Africa.” Social Finance Unit Working Paper 22, International Labour Office, International 
Labour Organization, Geneva.  
 
Siyongwana, Pakama Q. 2004. “Informal money lenders in the Limpopo, Gauteng and Eastern 
Cape provinces of South Africa.” Development Southern Africa 21(5): 851-66. 
 
Tanser, Frank, Victoria Hosegood, Till Bärnighausen et al. 2007. “Cohort profile: Africa Centre 
Demographic Information System (ACDIS) and population-based HIV survey.” International 
Journal of Epidemiology doi: 10.1093/ije/dym211. 
 
Young, Alwyn. 2005. “The gift of the dying: The tragedy of AIDS and the welfare of future 
African generations.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(2): 423-66. 
 
UNAIDS. 2008. 2007 Sub-Saharan Africa AIDS Epidemic Update, Regional Summary. 
 
 Weekend Argus, Saturday Edition. 2006. “Lobola – moving from cattle to cash.” (December 7, 
2006). Available on line at http://www.capeargus.co.za.     23 
 
Table 1. Africa Centre Demographic Surveillance Data  
 
All individuals in DSA  
2001 
  Illness and Death (IAD) Sample  
2003-2005 
Household characteristics 
Household size (HSE1)  10.35      10.08 
Number of resident members 
(HSE1) 
7.36     7.16 
Number of employed members 
ages 18+ (HSE1) 
1.96     1.96 
Number of children 0-17 
(HSE1) 
5.00     4.58 
Number of pension-aged 
household  members (HSE1) 
0.51     0.63 
Household assets (HSE1)  6.20      5.83 
Individual characteristics 
Female 0.526     0.515 
Age at HSE1  23.4    Age at death  38.4 
  --    Cause of death was AIDS  0.478 
Resident in DSA, Employed at 
HSE1 (ages 18+) 
0.337    Deceased employed when 
healthy (ages 18+) 
0.324 
Not resident in DSA, Employed 
at HSE1 (ages 18+) 
0.575      
Education at HSE1(ages 6+)  6.20      5.69 
Number of observations 
(individuals) 
81177     3751 
 
Note: When the IAD sample is restricted to those who were 18 and older (employment 
variables), the sample size is 2840. Information on education comes from the first socio-
economic survey (HSE1). IAD sample is restricted to deaths that occurred between January 2003 
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Table 2. Burial Societies and Funeral Policies 
 
BURIAL SOCIETY AND FUNERAL POLICIES 
Fraction with a policy   0.284     
Fraction pension-eligible with a policy   0.785     
Fraction non-pension eligible with a policy  0.182     
Number of observations  3668     
      
 
TYPE OF POLICY 
Conditional on 
reporting a policy, 
fraction with: 
 Money  paid  for 
funeral by type 
of policy: 
Traditional burial society  0.016    3520 
Funeral policy with:       
     Funeral parlor  0.542    3628 
     Insurer  0.408    5091 
     Bank/Retailer/Other  0.023    8373 
 





     Money for the funeral  0.907    4515 
     Coffin  0.230     
     Food  0.232     
     Transport  0.087     
     Tent  0.134     
Number of observations  1007     
 
Notes: Type of policy and fraction of policies that paid for expenses are conditional on the 
deceased having been covered by a funeral policy or burial society that paid at the time of the 
funeral.    25 
 
Table 3. Costs of Funerals 
 
Funeral purchases  









Coffin .710  858  1250 
Meat .946  1382  2061 
Groceries .974  1084  1414 
Tent .575  317  414 
Clothing .726  82    95 
Blankets .983  266  300 
Transport .692  318  334 
Other .113  64    97 
Total Rands        4273  5909 
Number of observations  3698  3682  1007 
 
Notes: Cost of the funeral are those not covered by a burial society or funeral policy. These 
include funeral purchases made with money received from a burial society or funeral policy at 
the time of the death. The number of observations in each mean varies because respondents 
sometimes did not know whether items were purchased. (For example, 3682 respondents knew 
whether meat was purchased; 3666 knew whether a tent was rented.) 
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Table 4. Accounting for Funeral Costs  





Household members  0.949    3789 
Other family  0.250    260 
Community 0.146    54 
Church 0.084    37 
Employer 0.037    80 
Other 0.011    14 
Total     4228 
Number of observations  3747     
MONEY BORROWED 
    
Fraction 
borrowing 
  Mean conditional on 
borrowing 
 .238    1387 
Number of observations  3615     
      
Conditional on borrowing, fraction  
borrowing from: 
  
Bank      .016   3815 
Money lender  .524    1326 
Employer of deceased  .007    2133 
Employer of another person  .038    2284 
Family outside the household  .138     1414 
Neighbor .248    1150 
Other .021    1482 
Number of observations  862      
ASSETS SOLD          Fraction 
selling assets 
  Mean conditional on 
selling 
                      .039    2650 
Number of observations  3635     
Notes: Cost of the funeral are those not paid for by a burial society or funeral policy. These 
include funeral purchases made with money received from a burial society or funeral policy at 
the time of the death. Sixteen observations were not used in calculating mean sum borrowed,  
conditional on borrowing, because either two borrowing sources were mentioned (5 cases), or 
none of our categories was mentioned (11 cases).      27 
 
  
Table 5. Individual Status, Funeral Spending and Borrowing  
                                                             
 
 Dependent  variable: 
   Funeral spending (Rand)   =1 if borrowed money for funeral 








 --  -- 
Relation of deceased to 
current head is ‘other’ 








Household characteristics?  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes    No  Yes 
Number of observations  3751  3334  3751  3334  3615  3219    3615  3219 
 
Notes: OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. Unobservables are clustered 
at the homestead level. All regressions include year of death indicators, a complete set of age 
indicators by 10-year age categories and an indicator that age at death was missing (5 cases). 
Omitted category for relationship of the deceased to current head of household includes parents, 
spouse and children. ‘Other’ relationships are: siblings, grandparents, grandchildren, sons- or 
daughters-in-law, other family and individuals not related to the current head of household. 
Household characteristics in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 are household size, household asset holdings 
and the maximum number of years of education in the household (all measured in 2001).      28 
 
Table 6. Household Income, Funeral Spending and Borrowing  
                                                             
 
 Dependent  variable: 
  Funeral spending (Rand)       =1 if borrowed money for funeral 
Household asset holdings  316.40 
(23.64) 
-- -- -- -- --    –0.009 
(0.002)
-- -- --  -- -- 
Maximum education of 
any household member 
HSE1 
--  325.04 
(24.27) 
-- -- -- 
  
--  -- –0.005 
(0.003)
-- -- -- -- 
Indicator: payments 
made for medical 
treatment before death  
-- --  –474.73
(131.89)
-- -- --    --  --  0.026 
(0.016)
-- -- -- 
Indicator: cause of death 
was AIDS 
-- -- --  –927.58
(119.52)
-- --    --  --  --  0.067 
(0.017)
-- -- 
Education of the 
deceased 
-- -- -- --  268.90 
(23.08) 
--  --  --  --  -- –0.008 
(0.002)
-- 
Deceased had a funeral 
policy 
-- -- -- -- --  –179.51 
(315.30) 
 --  --  --  --  -- –0.044
(0.043)
Funeral policy paid 
money  
-- -- -- -- --  1745.97 
(342.03) 
 --  --  --  --  -- –0.074
(0.043)
Money was borrowed for  
the funeral 
-- -- -- -- --  –41.78 
(109.87) 
 --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Number  of  observations 3653 3310 3751 3629 3485 3581    3524  3195  3615  3499  3374  3581 
Notes: OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses, allowing for correlation in the unobservables for observations from 
the same homestead. All regressions include year of death indicators, a complete set of age indicators by 10-year age categories and an 
indicator that age at death was missing (5 cases).    29 
Table 7. Differences in Responses by Borrowing Status   
  
 Dependent  Variable: 
   
total funeral expenses 
total funeral expenses net of 
funds borrowed 
 


















and  borrowers 
 (1)  (2)  (1)  − (2)  (3)  (1) − (3) 










Indicator: relationship to 























Maximum education of 





















Chi-square test: difference in 
coefficients is jointly 
significant (p-value)  
   6.48 
(.2619) 
  22.50 
(.0004) 
 
Notes: OLS regressions with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Unobservables 
are clustered at the homestead level. All regressions include age at death and age at death 
squared. For ease of computation, 5 observations were omitted because at age death was 
unknown.    30
Table 8. Testing Predictions of the Model   
  
 Dependent  Variable:    Ratio: 
 




Indicator: =1 if 
borrowed money 










Indicator: relationship to 






Chi-square test:  
X1 coefficients (p-value) 
     0.00 
(0.994) 





















X2 coefficients (p-value) 
     0.07 
(0.966) 
Estimate of Gamma        0.557 
Number of observations  3461  3381     
Notes: OLS regressions with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Unobservables 
are clustered at the homestead level. All regressions include age at death and age at death 
squared. For ease of computation, 5 observations were omitted because at age death was 
unknown.    31
Table 9. Maximum Likelihood Estimates   
  




  z-score 
1 β : Individual characteristics       
Female  –618.35 
(104.59) 
  5.91 
 
Indicator: relation to head is ‘other’  –1340.15 
(112.11) 
 11.95 
2 β : Predictors of household income 
Household assets  802.90 
(204.29) 
 3.98 
AIDS  death       –2121.55 
(605.58) 
 3.54 
Indicator: funeral policy paid money  5579.84 
(1412.85) 
 4.00 





      
Number of observations  3381     
 
Notes: Unobservables are clustered at the homestead level. 